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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL	
1	DCI		X			
	DDCI					
	EXDIR					
	D/ICS					
	DDI					
6	DDA					
7	DDO					
8	DDS&T					
9	Chm/NIC					
10	GC					
11	IG					
12	Compt					
13	D/Pers					
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15		X				
16	+					
17						
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19	NIO					
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2	1					
2:	2					
	SUSPENSE					

Remarks

TO #15: For your direct response.

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Executive Secretary
11 Oct 85

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The Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary

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Executive Registry
853870

CULBERT G. RUTENBER, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy of Religion

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Mr. William Casey Director of Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20000

Dear Mr. Casey:

I am trying to wean the key figure in one of our mainline denominational bureaucracies away from her acceptance of the Center for Defense Information as the "living bible" for knowing the truth. You are, of course, familiar with LaRocque's organization. I'm enclosing two things from his latest effusion which she sent me to impress me that he was right and I was wrong on certain matters. Could you check out (a) what is claimed on page 4 for what the CIA says and (b) the comparative strategic nuclear forces on page 5. In both cases I have indicated what I'm especially interested in by red ink. If the CIa did say what is claimed, does it say so now? Does the fact that we now know that there were two Soviet moles in the CIA call in question CIA statistics?

I have not underlined it because I do not want to lay a burden upon you but he claims in these two pages that the ability of the Soviet's Backfire to attack the United States is in dispute. It was my understanding that the Americans do not think it is under dispute at all, that this is only the Soviet insistence which they were able to sell to Carter because he wanted a treaty so badly.

I do not expect you to answer this letter personally but I would be happy if you could pass it on to an underling who would be willing to give me some angle on what I'm seeking. Of course I would be delighted if he would add anything further that he wants to about the trustworthiness of the Center for Defense Information.

This last paragraph is addressed to you. Why do you not fire John MacMahon, who I understand is responsible for the pathetic response of the U.S. to the needs of the Afghan freedom fighters? It's an obscenity. MacMahon will only work through Pakistan and most aid never gets through. Were I to suspect a Soviet mole in the CIA, I would begin with whoever is responsible for weapons to the Afghan rebels.

Sincerely yours,

Culbert G. Rutenbeg

Lancaster and City Avenues, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19151 (215) 896-5000

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U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES—July 1985

/	Total Weapons	<u>u.s.</u>	Soviet	•.
/	On ICBMs	2,124	6,250	
	On SLBMs	5,728	2,178	
	On Long-Range Bombers	3,614	780	(1,040 w/ Backfires)
	TOTAL	11,466	9,208	(9,468)
	Total Launchers	*		
	ICBMs	1,024	1,398	
	SLBMs	640	924	
	Long-Range Bombers	324	170	(300 w/ Backfires)
\	TOTAL	1,988	2,492	$(\overline{2,622})$

U.S. ICBMs: Includes 24 Titan II, 450 Minuteman II and 1,650 (550 x 3 MIRV) Minuteman III warheads. Titan retirements began in October 1982 and will continue at a rate of one every 30 to 45 days until September 1987. Plans call for replacement of 100 Minuteman IIIs with 100 10-warhead MX between late 1986 and late 1989. A single-warhead "Midgetman" ICBM will begin flight testing in 1988 and enter service in 1992.

U.S. SLBMs: 37 submarines carry ballistic missiles: 19 Poseidon submarines carry 16 Poseidon/C-3 missiles each with an average of 10 warheads apiece; 12 Poseidon submarines carry 16 Trident I/C-4 missiles each with an average of 8 warheads apiece; and 6 Trident submarines also carry Trident I/C-4s, 24 missiles each. In 1989 the Navy will begin deploying Trident II/D-5 missiles on the ninth and subsequent Tridents and backfitting them on the first eight Trident submarines. At least 20 Tridents are planned through the end of the century.

U.S. Bombers: Includes 167 B-52G, 96 B-52H and 61 FB-111A bombers in the active inventory. There are almost 3,250 weapons for the B-52s (1,052 gravity bombs, 1,020 SRAMs and 1,176 ALCMs). Ninety-eight B-52Gs now carry 12 ALCMs each. All 96 B-52Hs will be equipped to carry 20 ALCMs each between 1985 and the early 1990s. The FB-111As carry 366 weapons (122 SRAMs and 244 bombs). The first of 100 B-1B bombers will become operational in September 1986; the first of a planned 132 Advanced Technology Bombers (ATBs) will come on-line around 1992.

Soviet ICBMs: The road-mobile, single-warhead SS-25 is expected to begin deployment late this year, and a silo-based, 10-warhead SS-24 is expected next year, with a rail-mobile version perhaps following in 1987. Some estimates of Soviet ICBM warheads range as high as 6,420, which assumes full MIRVing. The following is a more realistic warhead loading estimate:

Type	Number		MIRVing	Nuclear Weapons
SS-11	520		no	520
SS-13	60		no	60
SS-17	10		no	10
SS-17	140	×	4 MIRV	560
SS-18	10		no	10
SS-18	298	×	10 MIRV	2,980
SS-19	10		no	10
SS-19	<u>350</u>	×	6 MIRV	2,100
	1,398		0 3-2201	6,250

Soviet SLBMs: Includes those carried by 3 Typhoon, 1 Delta-IV, 14 Delta-II, 4 Delta-II, 18 Delta-I, 1 Yankee-II and 20 Yankee-I modern submarines; the missiles on 1 Hotel-III, and 1 Golf-III submarines are also SALT-accountable. Two Delta-IV submarines have been launched and one has become operational with 16 SS-N-23 missiles. Some estimates of Soviet SLBM warheads range as high as 2,860, which assumes full MIRVing. The following is a more realistic warhead loading estimate:

Type	Number		MIRVing	Nuclear Weapons
SS-N-6	320		no	320
SS-N-8	292		no	292
SS-N-17	12		no	12
SS-N-18	32		no	32
SS-N-18	96	×	3 MIRV	288
SS-N-18	96	×	7 MIRV	672
SS-N-20	60	×	6-9 MIRV	450
SS-N-23	<u>_16</u>	×	7 MIRV	112
	924	,,	. 2/22264	$\frac{112}{2178}$

Soviet Bombers: Soviet bomber levels include 125 Bear, 45 Bison and 130 Backfire aircraft (the intercontinental capability of the Backfire is disputed; like the U.S. FB-111A, Backfire is not counted under the SALT II limits). This accounting assumes four weapons per Bear and Bison, either bombs or air-to-surface missiles, plus eight AS-15 long-range ALCMs apiece on 25 Bear-H bombers. A new heavy bomber, the Blackjack, could be operational by 1988 or 1989.

SOURCE: DOD, CIA, CRS, CDI. Chart prepared by Center for Defense Information.

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Mr. William Casey Director of Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20000

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